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Cicero, On Invention 1.51-77 
Hypothetical Syllogistic and the Early Peripatetics
by W illiam W. Fortenbaugh 
Rutgers University
I
In On Invention, a youthful work written perhaps as early as 90 B.C. 
and almost certainly no later than 80 B .C.,1 Cicero discusses confirmation 
or proof (confirmatio). The discussion begins with a survey o f various 
sources from which arguments may drawn (1.34-43). A fter that arguments 
are classified as necessary or probable (1.44-50).2 Finally Cicero considers 
two ways in which arguments proceed: either inductively or deductively 
(1.51-77). The treatment o f induction is comparatively short It runs six 
sections (1.51-6) and divides into several parts. Here are the parts in 
outline.3
1. An initial statement concerning the procedure of induction (1.51)
2. An example taken from a dialogue o f Aeschines (1.51-2)
3. Mention o f Socrates as a frequent practioner (1.53)
4. Four precepts concerning the use o f inductive argument (1.53-4)
5. An analysis o f induction into three parts (1.54)
6. An example based on the trial o f Epaminondas (1.55-6)
The treatment of deduction is not dissimilar,4 but it is longer, running a full 
twenty-one sections (1.57-77). It, too, divides into parts.
1. An initial statement concerning the procedure of deduction (1.57)
2. Report of competing analyses: one into five parts and another into
three; the analysis into five parts is set out in a lengthy example
concerning the administration of the universe (1.57-60)
1 All scholars agree that On Invention is an early work of Cicero’s, but how early is 
not certain. Kennedy (1972) p. 107-10 suggests that it was written between 91 and 89 
B.C., when Cicero was fifteen to seventeen years old. Achard p. 5-10 argues for 84-3 
B.C. and Kroll (1940) col. 1093 thinks the work may have been written as late as 80 
B.C. For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to decide between these dates.
2 Strictly speaking 1.50 is a transitional section in which Cicero refers both to what 
has been said concerning the discovery (invenire, inventio) of arguments from various 
sources or topics (ex his locis) and to what will be said concerning the ways in which 
arguments are advanced.
3 In dividing the treatments of induction and deduction into parts, I am not 
suggesting that no other divisions are possible. Rather I offer divisions which are based 
on the text and suit the purposes of this paper.
4 Several similarities between the treatment of induction and that of deduction are 
clear from the outlines. Each begins with a statement concerning the procedure under 
discussion (Ind. no. 1, Ded. no. 1). Philosophic predecessors are mentioned: Socrates for 
induction and Aristotle and Theophrastus for deduction (Ind. no. 3, Ded. no. 3). There is 
discussion of the number of parts into which each procedure divides (Ind. no. 5, Ded. no. 
2-4). Each procedure is elucidated by examples; Epaminondas appears within an example 
in both treatments (Ind. no. 2 and 6, Ded. no. 2 and 5).
23. Endorsement o f the five part analysis: it has been adopted by all 
who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus; a detailed 
argument in support of quinquepaitite analysis (1.61-6)
4. Summary overview o f the five parts (1.67)
5. Examples of arguments having different numbers o f parts: not 
only five and four parts—examples based on the trial of 
Epaminondas—but also three—an example concerning the 
destruction of Carthage—and even two and one— examples based 
on the woman who has given birth—(1.67-75)
6. Consideration of the way an argument is handled, especially 
variation in the order o f premises (L75-6)
7. Recognition that philosophers offer many other analyses, 
followed by the claim to have written about argument in oratory 
more accurately and diligently than others (1.77)
In the course of this paper, I shall say some things about Cicero’s 
discussion of induction, but my primary concern will be with his account of 
deduction. In particular, I want to call attention to Cicero’s argument for a 
quinquepaitite analysis of deductive reasoning (Ded. 3). It is remarkable in 
that it makes elaborate use of the mixed hypothetical syllogism, and also of 
some importance in that it supplements our evidence for early Peripatetic 
interest in syllogisms of this land. Recent scholarship on the history o f 
ancient logic has generally focused on later sources—like Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, Boethius, Philoponus and Simplicius5—  and pointed to 
Theophrastus as a significant contributor to the development of hypothetical 
syllogistic.6 Cicero, writing three centuries before Alexander, seems not 
only to confirm the importance o f Theophrastus but also to indicate that his 
contributions were recognized as such by Hellenistic rhetoricians. In 
presenting this thesis, I shall not be accepting Cicero’s claim to have written 
more accurately and diligently than others (Ded. 7), but I will suggest that 
the argument in favor of quinquepaitite analysis (Ded. 3) is more coherent 
than what precedes (Ded. 2) and that this difference is largely attributable to 
Cicero’s use of sources.
Π
The discussion of induction begins (Ind. 1) with a brief statement 
concerning the procedure. It is said to be “an argument which, through 
matters not in doubt, gains the assent of the person with whom one is 
arguing; and by this assent it wins his approval of a certain doubful matter 
because of a similarity to those matters to which he has assented” (1.51).7 
The fundamental idea here is not in doubt: by adducing parallel cases which 
are different but similar, we establish the truth of whatever concerns us.8
5 Alexander’s floruit is 200 A.D.; Boethius’ dates are c. 480-524; Philoponus and 
Simplicius were both active in the sixth century A.D.
6 See now the article (1985) by Jonathan Barnes. Interest in Peripatetic contributions 
to the development of the hypothetical syllogism has a long history. I mention only Carl 
Prantl and William and Martha Kneale, whose influential books were written in 1855 and 
1962 respectively.
7 1.51: inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius, quicum 
instituía est; quibus assensionibusfacit, ut Uli dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem 
earum rerum, quibus assensit, probetur.
8 See, e.g., Schweinfurth-Walla p. 147.
3For the sake of clarity, Cicero follows this statement w ith an example (Ind. 
2), in which Socrates reports a converstadon between Aspasia on the one 
hand and Xenophon and his wife on the other.9 Aspasia first gets 
Xenophon’s wife to agree that she would prefer her neighbor’s jewelry, 
clothing and other finery, should they be better than her own, and then asks 
whether she would prefer her neighbor’s husband, should he be a better 
man than her own husband. Xenophon’s wife responds by blushing, for 
she understands that her earlier admissions constitute an inductive argument 
leading to the conclusion that she would prefer her neighbor’s husband, 
should he, like the other items, prove better. Aspasia then puts sim ilar 
questions to Xenophon with the same result. She concludes that both 
husband and wife want the very best spouse. Unless they can bring it about 
that no better spouses exists in the world, they will always feel the lack of 
those they think best (1.51-2).
The example is clear and well illustrates what the initial statement 
concerning induction is intended to convey: through similar cases one 
establishes a different and doubtful matter. I offer only two comments.
First, the example helps us understand a detail in the initial statement. I am 
referring to the use of the singular in reference to the person with whom one 
is arguing.10 The singular suggests that the statement is oriented more 
toward dialectic than public oratory, and that impression is confirmed by the 
example of Aspasia questioning first Xenophon’s wife and then Xenophon 
him self.11 Second, this orientation toward dialectic fits the subsequent list 
o f precepts (Ind. 4): most especially the third precept which warns against 
disclosing where one’s questions are leading, and the fourth precept 
concerning possible moves, should the respondent deny or refuse to answer 
die final question (1.54). Such recommendations concern winning strategy 
and appear aimed at classroom exercises. They are not, however, directly 
relevant to the logical structure o f inductive argum ent That structure is 
unaffected by premature disclosure and obstinance on the part o f the 
respondent.
The account o f deduction, like that o f induction, opens with a statement 
o f the procedure (Ded. 1): Deduction is said to be uan argument which 
draws something probable from the m atter itself, and when this is set forth 
and examined in itself, it confirms itself by its own force and reasoning” 
(1.57).12 This statement is intended to establish a contrast with induction. A 
deductive argument, unlike an inductive one, does not adduce similar but 
different cases; rather it draws a conclusion “from the m atter itself.”13 W hat 
Cicero means by “from the matter itse lf’ is clear from earlier remarks within 
the discussion o f proof, i.e„ from what Cicero says concerning the 
discovery o f arguments (1.34-43)14 and their classification as either
9 The example is taken from the lost dialogue Aspasia, written by the Socratic 
Aeschines = V IA  fir. 70.4-26 (vol. 2 p. 615 Giannantoni).
10 1.51 eius, quicum ... i l l i ....
11 Cf. 1.55, where Cicero feels constrained to give an example which is oratorical (it 
is based on the trial of Epaminondas).
12 1.57: ratiocinatio est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquid elide ns, quod exposition 
et per se cognition sua se vi et ratione confirmet.
13 Schweinfurth-Walla p. 155, Achard p. 107 n. 166.
14 An argument is discovered (invention) by searching (quaerere) the various topics 
(loci) surveyed in 1.34-43. For invenire, quaerere, and locus see 1.38,44,50. On 1.50, 
see above note 2.
4necessary or probable (1.44-50). An argument like “If she has given birth, 
she has lain with a man” (1.44) is based,on cause and effect (1.37), and one 
like “If I was abroad when the murder occurred, I did not commit the 
murder” (1.45) is based on the location o f the act in question (1.38). In each 
o f these examples, the argument is completed by assuming (or establishing) 
tiie truth of the antecedent: “In fact she has given birth” and “In fact I was 
abroad.” In neither is proof accomplished by adducing similar cases. The 
two examples recur within the discussion o f deduction (1.72,74 and 1.63 
respectively) and are typical o f the deductive arguments under discussion by 
Cicero. Formally they are mixed hypothetical syllogisms of the if-then 
variety: “If P, then Q; but P; therefore Q.”15
I shall have more to say about such syllogisms before concluding this 
part o f my paper, but first I want to call attention to the fact that the initial 
statement concerning deduction is not immediately followed by an example, 
as is the case with induction. Instead, Cicero speaks o f a controversy 
between those who advocate a quinquepartite analysis o f deduction and 
those who prefer a tripartite analysis. We are told that the dispute does not 
concern the actual practice of oratory but rather how precepts ought to be 
given.16 That sounds like a practical matter in which pedagogical method is 
the focus o f controversy, but Cicero quickly indicates that it is also (or has 
become) a conceptual issue: While the one party says that there are five 
parts, the other holds that it is not possible to divide deduction into more 
than three parts?17 Cicero tells us that he is going to set out the controversy 
along with the reasoning on both sides, but what follows is not as 
informative as might be hoped for. First, we get an example of 
quinquepartite deduction without any statement concerning the reasons for 
preferring five parts (1.58-9). After that comes a statement o f the reasons 
for preferring three parts, but no example is offered (1.60).
There is an imbalance here which may be explained in part by Cicero’s 
youth. The work On Invention is a juvenile effort, so that infelicites are to 
be expected. That is true enough, but it may not be the whole story. As I see 
it, Cicero has deliberately omitted the reasoning of those advocating five 
parts, because he wants to present their reasons as his own; and that is in 
fact what happens. After completing his report concerning competing 
analyses (Ded. 2), Cicero makes, as it were, a new start (Ded. 3), first 
stating his preference for five parts and then saying that he must explain this 
preference (1.61).18 W hat follows is a well structured argument intended to
15 There are, of course, other kinds of mixed hypothetical syllogisms. In Part IV of 
this paper, I shall have occasion to consider the “separative” variety.
161.57 paululum in praecipiendi ratione dissenserunt.
17 1.57 nam partim quinqué eius partes esse dixerunt, partim non plus quam in tres 
partes posse distribuí putaverunt.
18 1.61 quare autem nobis ilia magis partitio probe tur, dicendum vide tur, ne temere 
secuti putemur; et breviter dicendum, ne in huiusmodi rebus diutius, quam ratio 
praecipiendi postulat, commoremur. “It seems necessary to say why I approve more of 
that (five part) division, lest I be thought to adopt it recklessly. And I must speak briefly, 
lest in matters of this kind I delay longer than is called for by the method of giving 
rules.” In fairness to Cicero, it may obsevered that these words do not explicitly rule out 
presenting an argument already advanced by others. But if Cicero is carefully choosing his 
words, then he is being coy. For what is said allows us to believe—or more strongly, 
encourages us to believe—-that he will speak for himself and on his own. And that is 
certainly an impression which Cicero would welcome. Cf. 1.50, where Cicero speaks of 
the negligence of those who write Artes; 1.77, where he claims to have written more
5demonstrate not only the possibility o f a five part analysis but also the 
wrongness o f three part analysis.19 That is exactly what we expect to find, 
but do not find, in Cicero’s report o f competing analyses. I shall say more 
about the argument for five parts in Part ΠΙ o f this paper. For the moment, I 
want to stay with Cicero’s indal treatment o f the quinquepartite analysis.
Instead of reporting the reasoning o f those who advocate five parts, 
Cicero lists the parts they recognize together with an illustrative argument 
concerning the order of the universe (1.58-9). The advocates are referred to 
each time a part is introduced (“they say,” “they think,” etc.), and the 
number of parts is emphasized by counting: “first,” “then,” “in the third 
part,” “in the fourth place” and “in the fifth place.” That gives an appearance 
o f order to Cicero’s remarks, but it cannot conceal certain difficulties. I 
mention three, o f which the first two are closely related.
First, the technical terms by which the parts are known are not formally 
introduced. Rather they become clear in the course of the discussion: the 
first premise is called the proposition the proof o f this premise is the 
propositionis approbation the second premise is the assumption its proof is 
the assumptionis approbation and the conclusion is the complexio. A t risky 
o f being fussy, I want to point out that using technical terms before defining 
or explaining them may be confusing.20 Consider propositio. The term does 
not occur where one expects to find it: i.e. at the very outset when the first 
premise is introduced (1.58). Instead, it makes its appearance later when the 
assumptio is introduced ( 1.59). That will create no difficulty for the 
educated reader, but the tyro may be puzzled.21
carefully and diligently than others; and 2.8, where he speaks of making contributions on 
his own (ex nostro). There may well be contributions by Cicero (see Achard p. 25-6); I 
am, however, suggesting that the argument of 1.62-6 is not one.
19 Cf. 1.63 sin autem ita est,falsum est non esse plus quant tripertitam 
argumentationem; “But if that is so, it is false that there is no argument of more than 
three parts.” Both Hubei p. 107 and Achard p. 111 introduce (im)possibility into their 
translations: “And if this is so, it is untrue that an argument can have no more than three 
parts” and “Mais, s’il en est ainsi, il est faux de dire que l’argumentation ne peut 
comporter plus de trois parties.” Whether or not esse here implies possibility, the 
translations correctly reflect the position taken by the advocates of tripartite analysis. See 
note 17.
20 The author of the Rhetoric to Herennius, probably Comificius, does better than 
Cicero in that he begins his discussion of five part argumentation with a list of the parts 
followed by a brief explanation of each (2.28). The illustrative argument comes later 
(2.28-30). It may be that Cicero’s source was organized in a similar way, and that Cicero 
moved the overview of parts to its present position (Ded. 4 = 1.67) when he took over the 
argument for five parts and made it his own (as I believe he did). But having said that, I 
do not want to suggest that the Rhetoric to Herennius is in other respects useful for 
interpreting On Invention, In particular, the five parts set forth are not the same as those 
found in On Invention, and attempts to relate them must fail (pace Matthes p. 206). 
Clearest is the fourth part, exornatio. It is said to be used for the sake of adornment and 
enrichment, once the argument has been established (2.28). That hardly fits On Invention, 
for there each of the parts is conceived of as a step in the argument None is recommended 
for use after the argument has been completed.
21 The Kneales p. 177-8 tell us that "Cicero did a useful service by inventing Latin 
equivalents for Greek technical terms." As an example, they cite propositio and refer to 
1.57ff. That may be correct, but the fact that propositio occurs first in 1.59 and without 
explanation suggests to me that it was already a terminus technicus, at least in Cicero's 
"classroom." It is used more formally in 1.67, but there Cicero has concluded the 
argument for quinquepartite analysis and is surveying the resulting five parts. He appears 
to be following his source and/or teacher closely and not introducing new terms.
6Second, when the first o f the five parts is introduced, it is described 
simply as the “the summit (summa) o f the argument” (1.58);22 and when 
the third part is introduced, we are told “to add it from the force o f the 
propositio (ex vi propositions)” (1.59).23 Again, the beginner may be 
puzzled. We can, however, find clarification in the later overview o f parts 
(Ded. 4). For there the propositio is said to be that “which briefly sets forth 
the source, from which the entire force (ex quo vis omnis) o f the argument 
ought to flow,”24 and the asswnptio is characterized as that “through which 
one assumes what is pertinent to showing (or proving the case), (deriving 
it) from the propositio (ex propositione)” (1.67).25 Both the later passage, 
the overview, and the earlier one, the description o f parts, are concerned 
with the hypothetical syllogism: i.e., the mixed hypothetical like “If P, then 
Q; but P; therefore Q.” In such a syllogism, the propositio does contain the 
“summit” and “force” of the argument: i f  the antecedent is granted, then the 
consequent follows.26 And the asswnptio is taken “from  the propositio” 
with a change.27 W hat was the antecedent in the conditional premise is 
asserted categorically in the asswnptio. So much is clear, but it remains 
opaque how die parts relate to the illustrative argument concerning the order 
o f the universe. For this example is not set out as a hypothetical syllogism; 
in fact its structure has become a m atter o f scholarly discussion.28
Third and last, the advocates o f five parts are said to think that the first 
premise o f a deductive argument should be proven “by a variety o f reasons 
and with the greatest possible fullness o f expression.”29 In a rhetorical
22 1.58 aiunt primum convenire exponere summam argumenationis.
23 1.59 aiunt, quod ostendere velis, id ex vi propositionis oportere assumere.
24 1.67 propositio, per quam locus is breviter exponitur ex quo vis omnis oportet 
entartet ratiocihationis. I have translated locus here with “source” in order to strengthen 
the connection with ex quo: “from which” flows the force of the argument Alternatively, 
“topic” might be preferred, since it may remind us of the earlier survey of loci in 1.34-43. 
We are to search through the loci in order to find an argument after which the argument 
is fleshed out by stating the second premise, the asswnptio, and the conclusion.
25 1.67 asswnptio, per quam id, quod ex proposition ad ostendum perinet, 
assumitur
26 In the categorical syllogism, the major premise does not contain the entire force 
(omnis vis) of the argument. Two premises including a middle term are needed before the 
power of the argument is revealed.
27 See Prantl vol. 1 p. 383-5 on μεταλαμβάνειν and μετάληψις.
28 For an interesting attempt to elucidate Cicero’s argument by introducing modem 
notation, see Schweinfurth-Walla p. 158. She correctly observes that Cicero has given 
little thought to the logic of the illustrative example. His concern is with the number of 
parts. The same can be said of the later (1.68-9) example of quinquepartite deduction (i.e., 
the first illustrative argument in Ded. 5). It is based on the well known trial of 
Epaminondas (stock material: see the example of induction in 1.55-6 = Ind. 6, as well as 
that of four part deduction in 1.70) and satisfies the earlier call for fullness of expression 
in the propositionis approbatio (1.68 satisfying the recommendation of 1.58, on which 
see the next paragraph). Nevertheless, Cicero seems quite unconcerned with logical 
clarity. The propositio (1.68) needs to be reformulated, and the asswnptio (1.69) is so 
unclear that scholars disagree where it is stated in the argument (see Kroll p. 4 and Achard 
p. 114 n.181 versus Schweinfurth-Walla p. 159-60, with whom I agree). My point is not 
that Cicero’s argument is hopelessly confused. It is rather that Cicero is not interested in 
logical structure. He is more concerned with elaborating the approbations, thereby 
emphasizing those parts which turn a three part argument into one of five parts. See 
Klein col. 1253-4.
29 1.58 rationibus variis et quam copiosissimis verbis.
context such a recommendation may be in place. In fact, it may be thought 
to pick up and underline an earlier remark in C icero's discussion o f proof: 
“The embellishment of an argument, once it has been discovered, and the 
dividing of it into definite parts are (tasks) most agreeable (to the audience) 
and especially necessary” (1.50).30 But having said that, I want to underline 
its irrelevance within the particular context The recommendation throws no 
light on the logical structure o f the illustrative argument, and has no direct 
relationship to the question at issue: five parts as against three. Indeed, an 
advocate of five parts might well reject fullness o f expression in favor o f 
brevity, or claim that either one may be desirable depending on the 
situation.31
ΙΠ
A fter reporting the competing analyses (Ded. 2), Cicero combines 
history and personal preference (Ded. 3). He declares him self in favor o f 
the quinquepartite analysis and tells us that this analysis has been adopted 
by those who follow Aristotle and Theophrastus. He adds that his 
preference must be explained, lest he be thought hasty in opting for five 
parts (1.61). W hat follows is an explanation or argument in three steps 
(L62-6), whose most striking feature is the use o f m ixed hypothetical 
syllogisms of the if-then variety.
Steps I (1.62-3) and Π (1.64-5) o f Cicero’s explanation are not only 
elaborate mixed hypothetical syllogisms, but each of the steps also 
introduces a shorter hypothetical syllogism in order to illustrate an obvious 
premise which needs no proof: i.e., it needs no approbation In both the 
longer and shorter syllogisms, the major divisions are clearly indicated: “i f ' 
(si) introduces the propositio; “but” (autem) marks the assumption and 
“therefore” (igitur) signals the com plexio32 Here are Steps I and Π in 
outline.
Step I = Inv. 1.62-3
Propositio: If 1) in some argument the propositio  is sufficient 
without an approbatio and 2) in another it is weak unless an 
approbatio is added, then the approbatio is separate from the 
propositio.
3 0 1.50 inventant (sc.argumentationem) exornan et certas in partes distinguí et 
suavissimum est et summe necessarium. The remark is part of a  transitional passage, on 
which see above, note 2. The adjective suavissimum refers to the pleasure provided to the 
listener, see Achard p. 102 n. 152.
31 L at»  in the discussion of refutation (1.89), Cicero takes account of the fact that 
orators may use many words to prove the propositio (deinde hoc approbant plurimis 
verbis), because they think that many words produce forgetfulness. The example takes the 
form of a mixed hypothetical syllogism: “If the inheritance was coming to him, it is 
probable that he committed the murder; But the inheritance was coming to him; Therefore 
he committed the murder.” Many words cause the listen»* to forget that the consequent in 
the hypothetical premise was expressed as probable.
32 In Step I, the first statement of the complexio has igitur (1.62). When the 
complexio is restated, igitur is replaced by ex hoc et ex eo (1.63). In Step II, igitur occurs 
in both statements of the complexio (1.64,65). In neither of the shorter syllogisms is the 
complexio expressed, for it is not in doubt and not directly relevant to the point at issue: 
namely, the obviousness of one of the premises.
8P ropositions appro batió: W hatever is able to be joined to and 
separated from something cannot be the same as that to which it is 
joined and from which it is separated
Assum ptio: But 1) there is some argument in which the propositio 
does not need an approbation and 2) there is another in which the 
proposito lacks force in d e  absence of an approbatio.
A ssu m p tio n s approbatio [postponed until after the com plexio  
is stated]: 1) A propositio winch is obvious does not need an 
approbation e.g., the propositio in the following argument:
Propositio: If I was in Athens on the day on which the 
murder was committed in Rome, I could not have been 
involved in the murder.
A ssum ptio : But I was in Athens on that day.
[Complexio: Therefore I was not involved.33] 
and 2) that a propositio may be in need of an approbatio is obvious 
so that a demonstration would be pointless.
Complexio [stated before and again after the assum ptions 
approbatio] : Therefore the approbatio is something separate from the 
propositio .
Step II = Inv. 1.64-5
Propositio: If 1) in some argument the assumptio is sufficient 
without an approbatio and 2) in another it is weak unless an 
approbatio is added, then the approbatio is separate from the 
assumptio.
[P ropositions approbatio: om itted34]
Assum ptio: But 1) there is some argument in which the assumptio 
does not need an approbatio, and 2) there is another in which the 
assumptio lacks force in the absence of an approbatio.
A ssu m p tio n s approbatio [postponed until after the com plexio  
is stated]: 1) An assumptio which is obvious does not need an 
approbation e.g., the assumptio in the following argument:
Propositio: If one ought to wish to be wise, it is fitting to 
study philosophy.
Assum ptio: But one ought to wish to be wise.
[Complexio: Therefore it is fitting to study philosophy.35] 
and 2) it is obvious that some assumptio needs on approbatio. 
Complexio [stated before and again after the assum ptions 
approbatio]: Therefore the approbatio is separate from the 
assumptio.
In contrast with Steps I and Π, Step ΠΙ (1.66) does not have a neatly 
articulated hypothetical form. The opening words, “And from these 
(arguments) the following is obvious,” 36 indicate dependence on the 
preceding two Steps; and what comes next, “that there is some argument in 
which neither the propositio nor the assumptio needs an approbation ’ 
combines parts of the assum ptions o f Steps I and II. In particular, it
33 On the omission of the complexion see note 32.
34 The absence of the propositions approbatio in Step II is not significant The 
propositions approbatio given in Step I holds for Step II and need not be repeated.
35 On the omission of the complexio, see note 32.
36 1.66 atque ex Ms illud iam perspicuum est.
9combines the first part o f the two asswnptiones. The conclusion, introduced 
by “from which it is recognized,”37 38is clear and in line with Steps I and Π: 
“The approbatio is contained in neither the propositio nor the assumption 
By drawing further on Steps I and II, we easily obtain the following 
hypothetical argument.
Step ΠΙ = Inv. 1.66
Propositio: [If 1) in some argument the propositio  and asswnptio 
are sufficient without an approbatio and 2) in another they are weak 
unless an approbatio is added, then the approbatio is contained in 
neither the propositio nor the asswnptio?*]
[P roposition's approbatio : om itted39]
Assum ptio: But 1) there is some argument in which neither the 
propositio nor the asswnptio needs an approbatio, [and 2) there is 
another in which the propositio and the asswnptio lack force in the 
absence of an approbatio.40]
A ssu m p tio n s approbatio : 1) From  Steps I and Π, it is obvious 
that there is some argument in which neither the propositio nor the 
asswnptio needs an approbatio, e.g., the propositio and the 
asswnptio in the following argument:
Propositio: If wisdom is to be sought above all, folly is to 
be avoided above all.
Assum ptio: But wisdom is to be sought above all. 
Complexio: Therefore folly is to be avoided above all.
[and 2) it is obvious that there is another in which the propositio and 
the asswnptio lack force in the absence of an approbatio.41] 
Complexio: From which it is recognized that the approbatio is 
contained in neither the propositio nor the asswnptio.
Having completed Step ΙΠ o f his argument in favor of a quinquepartite 
analysis o f deductive reasoning, Cicero, at the end o f 1.66, states by way of 
conclusion: “And if this is so, those who have divided argumentation into 
five parts have divided in a suitable manner.” The wording of this 
conclusion echoes Cicero’s initial endorsement o f the quinquepartite 
division in 1.61.42 “Those” in 1.66 has the same reference as “all who take 
their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus” in 1.61. Apparently Cicero 
believes that the quinquepartite analysis goes back in some important way to 
the early Peripatos. The correctness of that belief will be discussed in Part 
IV of this paper. For the moment, I want to underline that Cicero has been 
not only using mixed hypothetical arguments to defend the five part
37 1.66 ex quo cognoscitur.
38 The propositio is not stated, but it is easily supplied by combining the 
propositiones of Steps I and Π.
39 On the omission of the propositions approbatio, see note 34.
40 part 2 of the assumptio is not stated in Step III, presuambly because it is 
considered obvious. See the assumptions approbatio of both Steps I and II. There it is 
said to be obvious that the proposito and the asswnptio sometimes need an approbatio.
41 Concerning the omission of part 2 of the assumptions approbation see the 
preceding note.
42 The wording at the end of 1.67— quodsi ita est, commode partiti sunt illi, qui in 
quinqué partes tribuerunt argumentationem—recalls the beginning of 1.61: commodior 
illa partido videatur esse quae in quinqué partes tributa est, quam omnes ab Aristotele et 
Theophrasto profecti maxime secuti sunt.
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division, but also defending a five part division o f this mode of argument. 
That is clear both from the three examples he gives, one in each o f the three 
Steps,43 and from  the summary o v e rv iew ^  parts, which follows 
immediately (Ded. 4). I have already had occasion to refer to this overview 
(above, Part H) and repeat here what is significant. The proposito is 
described as that “from which the entire force of the argument ought to 
flow,” and the asswnptio as that “through which one assumes what is 
pertinent to showing (or proving the case), (deriving it) from the proposition 
(1.67). That is characterization in terms o f hypothetical syllogistic. The 
conditional statement o f the propostio contains the force o f the argument,44 
and the antecedent o f the conditional is adopted in the assumption where it is 
asserted categorically.
IV
Cicero tells us that quinquepartite analysis has been adopted by all who 
take their their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus. If  the argument o f Part 
ΙΠ is sound, it would seem that the analysis in question is a division of 
mixed hypotheticals. Can that be correct? The Stoics, after all, are known to 
have worked extensively on hypothetical syllogistic, and Cicero is likely to 
have been influenced by their work. I do not want to deny th a t Stoic logic 
was important in the Hellenistic period; the young Cicero will have been 
exposed to it through his teachers. But granting that, I want to call attention 
to the evidence for early Peripatetic work on mixed hypothetical syllogisms. 
It is not insignificant; and taken together with passages in On Invention, it 
provides good reason to believe what Cicero says, at least in regard to 
Theophrastus. Here is the most important evidence.
In the Prior Analytics, after speaking about arguments based on 
agreement and those established per impossible, Aristotle promises 
discussion o f other kinds o f hypothetical argument (1.44 50a39-b2). 
Aristotle does not say which lands o f hypothetical argument he intends to 
discuss, and it seems certain that he never fulfilled his promise. It fell to his 
successors to develop the subject. Alexander o f Aphrodisias reports that 
Theophrastus made mention o f the promised kinds in his Analytics and 
Eudemus did the same. Alexander goes on to list five kinds o f which the 
first is the mixed hypothetical syllogism o f the if-then variety {In APr p. 
390.2-9 = 111E.4-12). Philoponus tells us that lengthy treatises were 
written on the subject by Theophrastus, Eudemus and others o f A ristotle’s 
pupils, and also by the Stoics {In APr 242.18-21 = 111B.5-8 FHS&G). 
That suggests a substantial discussion o f hypothetical syllogistic by both 
Theophrastus and Eudemus, but Boethius says that Theophrastus only 
pursued the chief points or elements o f the subject, while Eudemus 
followed a broader path, but in such a way that he seems to have sown the 
seed without harvesting the crop {Hyp. syll 1.1.3 = 111A.6-10 FHS&G). 
W hat Boethius says may be taken to cast doubt on Philoponus ’ reference to 
lengthy treatises,45 but it seems quite possible that Boethius is either
43 The first two examples are incomplete in that the conclusion is not stated. In the 
third it is stated. For our purposes, the difference is unimportant Each of the arguments 
is a crisp, clear mixed hypothetical syllogism, which is used effectively to illustrate a 
detail in the larger argument.
44 Hence the argument “from one part,” in which “since” replaces “if”: “Since she 
has given birth, she has lain with a man” (1.74). See below, Part IV.
45 Pohlenz vol. 2 p. 29, Michel p. 182-3 and Graeser p.92-3.
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uninformed or disingenuous concerning the work o f Theophrastus and 
Eudemus.46 In any case, setting forth the elements o f hypothetical 
syllogistic need not, and should not, be thought o f as child’s play. W hat 
Theophrastus and Eudemus wrote, whether comparatively brief or lengthy 
as Philoponus reports, will have constituted an important contribution to die 
field of hypothetical syllogistic. It influenced the development o f Stoic logic 
and was taken up by rhetoricians who placed themselves within the 
Peripatetic tradition or drew eclectically upon it. Either way, Cicero will be 
reporting a correct tradition, when he speaks of those “who take their start 
from Aristotle and Theophrastus.”
Not only does Cicero make explicit reference to the founders of the 
Peripatos, but also much of what is said within the discussion o f deduction 
has parallels in latter reports concerning Theophrastus. I shall mention four 
parallels. First, we know from Alexander that Theophrastus concerned 
himself with hypothetical syllogisms in which either the conditional premise 
or the additional premise is doubtful and therefore in need o f proof (in APr 
p. 263.11-25 = 112A.22-37 FHS&G). That is, o f course, a m ajor 
consideration in Cicero’s argument in favor o f quinquepartite deduction, 
especially in Steps I and Π (1.62-5). M oreover, Alexander tells us that the 
additional assumption may be posited through induction, or hypothetical 
argument, or as obvious, or through a (categorical) syllogism (p. 388.17-20 
= 112B.1-3 FHS&G). We may compare Step Π o f the argument for five 
parts. Here Cicero asserts that an asswnptio which is obvious needs no 
approbatio and then supports the assertion by adducing a particular example 
in which the assumptio, “But one ought to wish to be wise,” is said to be 
obvious (1.65).
Second, Alexander reports that the older men, i.e. the early Peripatetics, 
characterized the additional premise as μεταλαμβανόμενον. It is not 
posited “from outside” (ού εξωθεν); rather it appears in the conditional 
premise, but not in the required form. There it is part o f a hypothetical and a 
sequence; it must be changed into an assertion when adopted as the 
additional premise (p. 263.26-36 = 112A.38-49 FHS&G). The idea is the 
same in the Ciceronian description of the assumptio: it does not come “from 
outside,” but rather “from the proposition (ex propositions 1.67).
Third, Simplicius reports that “since” (έπεί) is used instead of “i f ’ (ει) 
in hypothetical arguments in which the antecedent is not only true but also 
obvious and undisputed. We arc also told that the younger men, i.e. the 
Stoics, call this kind of proposition “parasynaptic” and that Theophrastus, 
in his Prior Analytics, made clear the reason for using “since” (In De cáelo 
p. 552.31-553.4 = 112C.1-5 FHS&G). Concerning the Stoics we are well 
enough informed. They distinguished between the synaptic conjunction, 
“if,” which announces sequence, and the parasynaptic conjunction, “since,” 
which announces both sequence and fact (Diogenes Laertius 7 .71).47 In 
regard to Theophrastus we are less well informed; but if  Simplicius has not 
misrepresented him, he will have offered a reason for using “since.”
Perhaps he emphasized economy, pointing out that “since” introduces the
46 Here as elsewhere in this paragraph I am drawing on Barnes p. 125-9. His fuller 
statement should be consulted, as should that of Prantl p. 375-89.
47 DL. 7.71 : επαγγέλλεται δ ’ δ σύνδεσμος (sc. επεί) άκολουθεΐν τε τδ δεύτερον τφ 
πρώτφ και τδ πρώτον ύφεστδναι: “The <parasynaptio conjunction <‘since‘> announces 
that the second follows the first and the first is fact.” I.e., the consequent follows on the 
antecedent, and the antecedent is fact. Diogenes cites the Stoic Crinis as his source (SVF 
vol. 3 p. 269.1-6).
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antecedent as fact, so that the additional premise of the conditional 
hypothetical argument need not be stated. J f  he did say that, he may have 
added that the use o f “since” also removes the need to state the conclusion 
separately. For what would be the consequent in a conditional hypothetical 
(i.e., in the synaptic) now expresses the conclusion. Be that as it may,48 we 
have in Cicero a clear example o f “since” replacing “if.”49 It is not found 
within Cicero’s argument in favor o f five parts (Ded. 3 ), but in the later list 
o f illustrative arguments, each o f which has a different number o f parts 
(Ded. 5). I am thinking of the last example, i.e., that o f an argument with 
one part: “Since she has given birth, she has lain with a man” (1.74).50 In 
expression (diction), the argument differs little from the conditional 
propositio “If she has given birth, she has lain with a man.” The only 
difference is that “since” (quoniam) has been substituted for “i f ’ (si). But 
“since” announces the truth o f the antecedent, i.e. she has in fa c t given 
birth, and that makes the complex statement a clear argument which needs 
no supplement.51
Fourth, we should remember that mixed hypothetical syllogisms come 
in several varieties. In Alexander’s list o f kinds passed over by Aristotle but 
mentioned by Theophrastus and Eudemus, the conditional hypothetical 
comes first and the separative comes second (In APr p. 390.9-10 = 111E.6-
48 In his Introduction to Logic 3.3 = 11 ID. 1-13 FHS&G, Galen tells us that the 
older Peripatetics called a conditional premise “hypothetical by connection/* He also 
comments that either εί or ειπερ may introduce the antecedent. We can say confidently 
that Theophrastus belongs among the older Peripatetics who spoke of “hypothetical by 
connection.” Less clear to me is whether Galen’s comment concerning the use of εί or 
ειπερ would be endorsed by Theophrastus in all contexts. In a logical treatise, he might 
well treat εί and ειπερ as identical and contrast both with έπεί, but in a rhetorical context 
he may have taken note of the fact that ειπερ can be used in two different ways: either as a 
strengthened form of εί or as a subtle synonym for έπεί. I.e., ειπερ may be used in order 
to imply, without announcing, the truth of die antecedent. See LSJ&M s.v. Π, and 
Galen's own use of ειπερ at the end of 3.3 = 111D.12 (assuming Keiffer's emendation is 
correct).
491 cite the example found within the treatment of deduction (1.74). If we consider 
earlier remarks on arguments which are probable, we may cite a second example. For 
there (1.47) a distinction is drawn between a “true” argument and a plausible one. The 
form»* is illustrated by “Since there is a scar, there was a wound,” and the latter by “If 
there is much dust on his shoes, he must have come from a journey.” In the former case, 
we have an argument which has been discovered (inventum) by considering causation (cf. 
1.37), and it is called “true” because the antecedent is announced as fact. That does not 
change the status of the argument from probable to necessary. It still may be that no 
wound (understood to be damage inflicted by an external agent) occurred (or was inflicted). 
The scar may be the result of, e.g., a disease which caused the skin to erupt
5 0 1.74 quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit.
51 Schweinfurth-Walla p. 162 explains the argument as a two part inference, whose 
propositio is not expressly formulated and whose assumptio and complexio are brought 
together in a single sentence. Out of all context, I have no quarrel with this analysis, but 
for our purposes it is important to underline the fact that Cicero is introducing a complex 
proposition which was formally recognized by the Stoics (it belongs among τα ούχ άπλα 
αξιώματα and is labeled παρασυνημμένον, Diogenes Laertius 7.71) and discussed by the 
early Peripatetics including Theophrastus. Moreover, a close relationship between the 
synaptic and parasynaptic proposition was recognized. In Diogenes Laertius, they are 
discussed one after the other (7.71); and Simplicius, having introduced the synaptic to 
elucidate the parasynaptic, refers to the first part of the parasynaptic proposition as the 
antecedent (In De cáelo p. 553.1 = 112C.1 FHS&G and p. 553.11 which is not printed in 
FHS&G).
13
8 FHS&G). According to Galen, “separative” is the term used by the older 
philosophers, i.e. the Peripatetics. The more recent philosophers, i.e. the 
Stoics, called it “disjunctive”.52 Both schools were concerned with 
arguments in which the hypothetical premise has the form “either—or” 
(ήτοι—ή). Galen’s example opposes day and night: “Either it is day, or it is 
night” (Introduction to Logic 3.3-4 = 1 1 1D.3-18 FHS&G). Put 
schematically, the argument in its entirety runs as follows: “Either P or Q, 
but P, therefore not Q” (“but not P, therefore Q”). This kind o f hypothetical 
argument appears in Cicero’s list o f illustrative arguments (Ded. 5). His 
example is “Either we ought to fear the Carthaginians, if  we leave them 
unharmed, or we ought to destroy their city; but assuredly we ought not to 
fear them; it remains, therefore, that we ought to destroy their city” 
(1.72).53
These four parallels, in combination with two references to those who 
take their start from the Aristotle and Theophrastus (1.61,66), are, I think, 
reason to say that the discussion o f deduction in On Invention contains 
evidence for early Peripatetic work on hypothetical syllogistic and its 
influence throughout the Hellenistic period. That is not to claim  direct 
knowledge of Theophrastus (and Eudemus) on the part o f the young 
Cicero. W hether in his teens or early twenties,54 Cicero was not reading 
difficult Peripatetic texts, which in any case may have been unavailable, or 
largely so, in Rome at that time.55 Rather Cicero was dependent on his 
teachers o f rhetoric and the handbooks they recommended. These sources 
were, however, influenced by the early Peripatetics and that influence was 
acknowledged. When Cicero names Aristotle and Theophrastus, he is 
following his source(s), teacher or handbook, and the argument which 
occurs between the first and second reference to these Peripatetics reflects 
early Peripatetic thinking.56 The argument is well structured and in that 
regard quite different from the illustrative argument o f the preceding 
report57 My guess is that this difference is attributable to Cicero’s handling
52 Strictly speaking “separative” and “disjunctive” characterize the hypothetical 
premise: for the Peripatetics it is a πρότασις υποθετική κατά διαίρεσιν; for the Stoics, a 
διεζευγμένόν αξίωμα (Galen, Introd. 3.4 = 11 ID. 17-18).
53 1.72 out metuamus Carthaginienses oportet, si incólumes eos reliquerimus, aut 
eorum urbem diruamus. at metuere qiddem non oportet, restât igitur, ut urbem diruamus.
54 See note 1.
55 We may regard with scepticism the story of Theophrastus' library—i.e. his books 
and those of Aristotle were carried off to Scepsis, then back to Athens and finally to 
Renne where they w oe eventually published by Andronicus some time after the middle of 
the 1st c. B.C. (Strabo, Geography 13.1.54 and Plutarch, Sulla 26.1-3 = 37-8 
FHS&G)—and still hold that the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus were largely 
unavailable in Rome, when Cicero composed On Invention, i.e., between c. 90 and 80 
B.C. But certainty here is elusive, so that differing views are to be expected. Cf. Schmidt 
p. 18-19, who believes, partly on the basis of On Invention 1.61, that Theophrastus’ 
rhetorical works were known to educated men in Rome before Sulla brought the Library 
of Theophrastus to the city in 83 B.C.
56 In the example within Step I, Rome is paired with Athens. The pairing is not 
early Peripatetic; mostly likely the rhetorical source followed by Cicero contained the 
pair, but it is possible that Cicero introduced it himself. In any case, what is being 
illustrated, an obvious premise, and the form of the illustration, a mixed hypothetical, are 
entirely in place in a source which claims roots in the early Peripatos.
5 ' I n  tiiis way it differs also from the illustrative argument which follows in 1.68-9. 
See above, note 28.
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of sources. The reasoning of the advocates o f five parts—reasoning which 
we might expect to occur as part of the preceding report (Ded. 2)—has been 
carefully reproduced under the guise o f Cicero’s own explanation for 
preferring quinquepartite analysis (Ded. 3). But whether or not Cicero is 
disingenious, his explanation is evidence both for early Peripatetic work on 
hypothetical syllogistic and for its influence among rhetoricians o f the 
Hellenistic period.
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